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I. Introduction
On July 13, 2006, the European Court of First Instance ("CFI")
set a historic precedent and put a temporary end to the creation of
the second-largest music company in the world.' Disrupting this
creation of a musical powerhouse required the coordination of
several governmental bodies within the European Union. The
European Commission ("Commission") is responsible for
enforcing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community ("EC Treaty") that prevent unfair
competition and abuse of a dominant position2 within the
I Oliver Bretz, Opinion Merger Hopefuls Should Take Note of Sony-BMG
Debacle, THE LAWYER, July 24, 2006, at 8.

2 According to Article 82 of the.EC Treaty, abuse of a dominant position occurs if:
it "affect[s] trade between Member States," imposes an "unfair trading condition"
(including unfair prices), limits "production, markets or technical development[s] to the
prejudice of consumers," applies conditions that are skewed towards other trading parties
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community market.' After the Commission has cleared or rejected
a merger, a complaint may be lodged in the CFI where a review
will be conducted of the Commission's decision; the CFI will
subsequently annul the decision if it finds the reasons were not
"sustainable." 4 Since this process is typically a formality, the July
decision in Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association
("Impala") v. Commission5 marked an unexpected precedent as
the first time the CFI annulled a merger that had received
clearance by the Commission.6 Even more surprising than the
annulment, the party who caused the shutdown was Impala, a third
party association of small, independent music production
companies.' The decision by the CFI reinforced the image of
David and Goliath, as the relatively unknown third party was able
to take down the music behemoth: Sony BMG. This groundbreaking decision brought attention to the increasing power within
the European Union of third parties to stop, or at least substantially
hinder, the process of merger review.
However, third parties are not the only ones unhappy with the
European merger process. The decision demonstrated the CFI's
preference for a more comprehensive approach to merger review
from the Commission, and no one was more surprised than the
previous European Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti, who
had just "revamp[ed]" his merger-review process after three of his
decisions to block major mergers in 2002 were reversed.8 The
CFI's ruling was to be a test-run for the new rules, and has now
to place them at a competitive advantage, or makes "the conclusion of contracts subject
to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts."
Consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002
O.J. (C 325) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
3 PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE B(IRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 1064
(Oxford University Press, 3d ed. 2003). This power is granted by Article 85 of the EC
Treaty. Id. The Commission may become aware of a violation of either of these articles
by either investigation, if the parties notified an agreement to the Commission, or if an
aggrieved party complains. Id. at 1064-1068.
4 Id. at 1071.
5 Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers and Labels Ass'n v. Comm'n, 2006 ECJ
CELEX LEXIS 359, (2006).
6 Bretz, supra note 1.
7 Id.
8 Let's Try That Again, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2006.
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"cast doubt on his overhaul," sending the signal that perhaps the
rules still need to be adjusted or a more comprehensive review
should take place. 9
This Note will explore the facts and holding of Independent
Music Publishers and Labels Association ("Impala") v.
Commission,1° in Part II. Part III will examine background law,
and Part IV will provide an analysis of the court's opinion.
Finally, this Note will conclude that the Commission should
employ a merger review process that would parallel the process
used by the United States, thereby making it more difficult for
third parties to bring actions against merger clearances, and
restraining third parties' ability to clog the judicial system.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
On January 9, 2004, two media giants, Bertelsmann AG
("Bertelsmann") and Sony Corporation of America ("Sony"),
requested permission from the European Commission1 ' to merge
their "global recorded music businesses" to form an enterprise
operated under the name Sony BMG. 12 In order to determine the
reaction to the merger within the music industry, the Commission
sent out questionnaires3 to several industry competitors and
"players" in the market.' Impala, consisting of 2,500 independent
music production companies, submitted to the Commission
reasons why the merger would disrupt trade between the Member

9 Id.

10 Case T-464/04,
11 According to the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission is entitled to

"exclusive jurisdiction over 'concentrations' having a "Community dimension." Keith
R. Fisher, Transparency in Global Merger Review: A Limited Role for the WTO?, 11
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 327, 340 (2006) (citing Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21
December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L
257) 13, amended by Council Regulation 1310/97 of June 30, 1997, 1998 O.J. (L 180) 1,
amended by Council Regulation 139/2004 of January 20, 2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24/1) 1).
Additionally, even some "M&A transactions involving undertakings based outside the
EC are nonetheless covered if they have sufficient turnover within more than one
Member State." Id.
12 Case T-464/04, IN 1-5.
13

Id. 7.
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States and should be considered "incompatible with the common
market."' 14 Impala claimed this incompatibility arose because the
merger would result in detrimental effects on the market including
hindering market access and limiting consumer choice.15 By May
24, 2004, the Commission notified the parties to the agreement
that they agreed with Impala, and determined that the merger was
"incompatible with the common market... since it would
strengthen a collective dominant position in the recorded music
market and in the wholesale market for licenses for online music
and would coordinate the parent companies' behavior in a way
incompatible with Article 81 EC.' 6
Typically, collective dominance arises when a concentration
(synonymous with merger) creates a "dominant position between
the parties to the concentration and another party on that
market;"' 7 it is usually used to catch "oligopolistic collusion."' 8 In
order to determine whether such collusion or "collective
dominance" might take place, the Commission must project
whether the merger would allow the companies to control the
recorded music market by acting "independently" of both other
market participants and consumers.' 9 Due to objections from both
Sony and Bertelsmann, the parties came together before a Hearing
Officer and after hearing the arguments, the Commission
determined that the creation of Sony BMG would not be anticompetitive and gave the merger clearance to proceed.2 ° On July
19, 2004, the Commission officially announced its final decision
14 Id. According to Article 81 of the EC Treaty, any agreement that may "affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market" are considered to be
"incompatible with the common market." CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 3 at 938.
15 Case T-464/04, 7.
16 Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers and Labels Ass'n v. Comm'n, 2006 ECJ
CELEX LEXIS 359,
8-9 (2006). "The following shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by association
of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market..." EC Treaty art. 8 1(1).
17 CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 3 at 1051.
18

Id. at 1053.

19 Id.
20

Case T-464/04, 1 10-11 (2006).
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that the concentration was compatible with the market, and there
was no collective dominance. 2' The Commission reached this
decision by an analysis of the similarity of products available, the
transparency of pricing in the market, and whether there were
barriers to entry or other market constraints.22 Impala claimed the
decision did not meet the requisite legal standard since it was
based upon faulty reasoning and incorrect data,23 and brought the
action before the CFI requesting an expedited procedure 24 which
was granted on January 24, 2005.25
B. Review of Commission Decisions
The Commission has been granted wide discretion in decisions
that require economic forecasting and assessments, which requires
Community Courts (including the CFI and ECJ) to give merger
clearances by the Commission particular deference due to their
inherently "economic nature. 26 However, the Commission cannot
be seen as omnipotent in deciding upon mergers, and the Court of
Justice limited this discretion by holding that despite a wide
"margin of discretion with regard to economic matters," the
Community Courts must evaluate whether the Commission used
all of the necessary and most reliable data to support the
underlying conclusion.2 ' Therefore, the current standard of
deference is for the CFI to determine whether the Commission's
conclusion of no collective dominance was "vitiated by a manifest

21 Id. (emphasis added).
22 Case T-464/04, 243.
23 Id. T 31 (emphasis added).
24 Id. T 14. A system of hearing appeals in the CFI, "adopting written procedures
but with a full oral hearing... [t]he benefit of the expedited procedure, however, is that a
judgment can be produced within eight to ten months from the original Commission
decision rather than the two to three year period previously experienced." D.G. GOYDER,
EC COMPETITION LAW 393 (F.G. Jacobs ed., Oxford University Press 2004).
25 Case T-464/04, 1

13-19.

26 Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers and Labels Ass'n v. Comm'n, 2006 ECJ
CELEX LEXIS 359, 327 (2006).(citing Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and
Others v. Comm'n ("Kali and Saiz"), 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, IT 223-224 (1998); Case C12/03, Comm'n v. Tetra Laval, 2005 E.C.R. 1-987, T 38 (2005)).
27 Id. 328 (citing Case C-12/03 Comm'n v. Tetra Laval, 2005 E.C.R. 1-987, T 39
(2005)).
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error." 28
C. Holding
It is through this standard that the Court of First Instance must
determine whether the merger would meet the three conditions
that create collective dominance:
First, the market must be sufficiently transparent for the
undertakings which coordinate their conduct to be able to monitor
sufficiently whether the rules of coordination are being observed.
Second, the discipline requires that there be a form of deterrent
mechanism in the event of deviant conduct. Third, the reactions of
undertakings which do not participate in the coordination, such as
current or future competitors, and also the reactions of customers,
should not be able to jeopardize the results expected from the
coordination.29
Transparency occurs when price changes can be seen and
quickly adapted to by competitors. 3° The music industry is
particularly transparent in the European Union due to the
publication of "weekly hit charts" that list the bestselling albums
and the corresponding prices which "greatly facilitates" the ability
of competitors to monitor the pricing of others in the industry.3
Additionally, there is a very small "number of players in the
market,"32 and Sony and BMG had set up a process whereby they
would receive weekly reports on competitors pricing.33 Due to
these obvious factors, the CFI criticized the Commission for not
supporting its decision with "statements of the requisite legal
standard" and for not evaluating all of the relevant information in
determining there was not sufficient transparency in the recorded
music industry to create collective dominance.34 In its historic
precedent, the court agreed with Impala and determined that the
creation of Sony BMG would lead to a loss in revenues for
28

Id.

329.

29 Id. .247 (citing T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585, T 63
(2002)).
30 CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 3 at 943.
31Case T-464/04, 349.
32 Id. 1351.
33 Id. 1352.
34 Id. 1459.
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recording artists due to the inevitable price hike in CD prices as
the competition tightened within the market.35 The ultimate
holding was not that the merger would never be allowed, but that
the Commission, after being "told off for not doing its homework
properly,, 36 must re-examine the deal since they had not
"substantiated" the case.37
III.Background Law
A. Adverse Commission Rulings
The most recent litigation that led to the CFI overturning the
Sony BMG merger began during the "2002 crisis" in the
Commission. 38 Three of the Commission's decisions to block
mergers were overturned by the CFI in a matter of five months,3 9
and Commissioner Monti was subsequently pressured to make
changes in both the procedural and substantive process of merger
review. 4° The CFI left little unsaid in their successive decisions as
they issued "severe criticisms"'" of the Commission's work.42
After sequential evidence that their system was not only not
working but under attack, the Commission instituted several
changes to increase the checks and balances within the system
including increasing the ability of third parties to view the file and
have a greater say in the merger review process.43 After so many
overturned and berated decisions, 2003 was "widely regarded as
35 Joe Kirwin, Citing Faulty Analysis, EU Court Vacates EC's 2004 Approval of
Sony-BMG Merger, INT'L BUS. AND FIN. DAILY, July 14, 2006.
36 Let's Try That Again, supra note 8.
37 Music Mergers, FIN. TIMES LIMITED (London), July 14, 2006, at 16.
38 GOYDER, supra note 24, at 394.
39 Id.; see also Paul Betts, Court Challenge to Music Merger: Court Edict Puts
Record Industry in a Spin, FIN. TIMES LIMITED (London), July 14, 2006, at 22 ("[T]he

Luxembourg court had already dealt the Commission three embarrassing blows by
annulling its decision to block the Schneider-Legrand merger, the Tetra Laval-Sidel deal
and the Airtours-First Choice Holidays merger.").
40 GOYDER, supra note 24 at 394; see also Let's Try That Again, supra note 8

(noting that due to the previous three reversals Mario Monti had to "revamp" the
previous merger-review process).
41 GOYDER, supra note 24 at 394-396.
42

Id.

43

Id.
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the low point in the more than [ten] years [that] the Commission
has had antitrust regulatory powers in the single market ....".
,
The first, and most critical, decision that began the 2002
Commission crisis is Airtours v. Commission.45 In this decision,
Airtours, a British tour operator, alerted the Commission of its
anticipated acquisition of another U.K. tour operator, First Choice,
but the Commission warned the merger would create a collective
dominant position in the "UK short-haul foreign package holiday
market" between the merged companies and another tour operator
that was not a party to the transaction.46 Although the merger
would have left three of the travel companies holding eighty
percent of the market, the CFI overturned the Commission by
"severely criticiz[ing] the quality of the Commission's economic
reasoning 47 and determined the merger could go forward as
originally planned since they had incorrectly analyzed the
market.48
The second in the trio of Commission disappointments came
during Schneider v. Commission,49 one of the first cases to
implement the CFI's new procedure of hearing certain appeals on
an expedited basis (the method subsequently used in Impala).5°
After analyzing the market for electrical equipment in Europe, the
Commission denied the merger claiming the "concentration was
incompatible with the common market."'" However, the CFI
found the Commission's analysis of the electrical equipment
market inadequate,52 and that due to several errors, including the
misapplication of regulations, the Commission was once again
overturned and the merger was allowed.53
44 Kirwin, supra note 35.

Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585.
46 F.O. W. VOGELAAR, THE EUROPEAN COMPETITION RULES: LANDMARK CASES OF
THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND THE COMMISSION 279 (Europa Law Publ'g 2004); see
GOYDER, supra note 24, at 367, 392.
47 GOYDER, supra note 24, at 367.
48 Id.
45

49 Case T-310/01, Schneider Elec. v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071.
50 GOYDER, supra note 24, at 393.

51 Schneider,2002 E.C.R. 11-4071, at 4080.
52 GOYDER,

supranote 24, at 393.

53 Schneider, 2002"E.CR. 11-4071.

2007]

EUROPEAN MERGER REVIEW

The third blow to the Commission came in Tetra Laval BV v.
Commission.54 Tetra Laval, a manufacturer of food cartons,
proposed a merger with Sidel, a manufacturer of plastic bottles,
but the Commission declared it incompatible since Tetra could use
its market position to force "mixed bundling" onto their customers
by requiring them to buy their plastic requirements only from
Sidel.55 However, the CFI determined that the Commission's
determination "fell far short" of establishing that the merger
56
should not be allowed on the basis of possible dominance.
B. Third Party Weight
In addition to the precedent leading up to the CFI's propensity
to overturn the Commission, there is also important case law
preceding the current weight given to third parties and their ability
to throw substantial roadblocks into the merger review process. It
is difficult to identify a clear progression in this area since, as
some sources have noted, although other areas of European law
are clearly defined, the European Union is missing "complete
transparency with respect to submissions by the merging parties'
competitors and the extent to which they will be permitted to
participate in the process."57
Historically, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has
exercised broad discretion in determining who has standing to
bring an action in cases that arise under Articles 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty regulating competition.58 This discretion is regulated
by the European Economic Community ("EEC") Council
Regulation 17, Article 3(2)" 9 which states, "a Member State, or
54 Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4382.
55 GOYDER, supra note 24, at 393. According to this theory, Tetra would give
discounts to those packagers on "future carton purchases, on condition that they also
acquired their plastic bottle machinery from Sidel." Id.
56 Id.; see also VOGELAAR, supra note 46, at 274-275 (discussing the CFI's decision
to overturn the Commission).
57 Fisher, supra note 11, at 337 (2006); see also Pieter Kalbfleisch, European
Merger Control: A Case of Second Mover Advantage?, in MODELLING EUROPEAN
MERGERS 27, 28 (Peter A.G. van Bergeijk et al. eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.,
2005) (noting that the case law for competition policy, especially in Europe, is not very
well developed since it is a comparably new topic within commercial law).
58 CRAIG & DE BORCA, supra note 3, at 506.

59 European Economic Community Council Regulation 17/62, First Regulation
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any natural or legal person who claims to have a legitimate
interest, can make an application to the Commission, putting
forward evidence of a breach of Articles 81 and 82."'60
This definition of who could bring an application was put to
the test in Metro-SB-Gro3mdrkte GmbH & Co KG v.
Commission.6' Metro, a third party, brought an action against
SABA when SABA refused to recognize them as a wholesaler for
distribution of electronic equipment.62 The Commission had
previously ruled that SABA's distribution system did not violate
Article 85, but Metro filed an action in order to annul the
decision. 63 Although there was initially a question of whether a
third party would have standing and "could claim to be
individually concerned by a decision addressed to another, 64 the
ECJ determined that:
It is in the interests of a satisfactory administration of justice and
of the proper application of Articles 85 and 8665 that natural or
legal persons who are entitled, pursuant to Article 3(2)(b) of
Regulation No 17, to request the Commission to find an
infringement of Articles 85 and 86 should be able, if their
request is not complied with wholly or in part, to institute
proceedings in order to protect their legitimate interests. In
those circumstances the applicant must be considered to be
directly and individually concerned....

In a case similar to Impala, the CFI in Bureau Europien des
Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) v. Commission6 7 took Article

Implementing Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 1962 O.J. (013). It is important to note
that this regulation now governs Articles 81 and 82 due to the renumbering of the Treaty
of Amsterdam (ToA).
60 CRAIG & DE BORCA, supra note 3, at 506.
61 Case 26/76, Metro-SB-GroBmdrkte GmbH & Co KG v. Comm'n, 1977 E.C.R.
1875; see also Cases 228, 229/82, Ford Werke AG v. Comm'n, 1984 E.C.R. 1129; Case
T-12/93, Comit6 Central d'Entreprise de la Societe Anonyme Vittel v. Comm'n, 1995
E.C.R. 11-1247 (noting other situations in which the complaint was allowed standing).
62 Metro-SB-Groimdrkte, 1977 E.C.R. 1875 8.
63 CRAIG & DE BLJRCA, supra note 3, at 506. Due to the ToA, the original Article 85
became Article 81. Id.
64 Id.
65 Note ToA renumbering: Arts. 85 and 86 are currently Arts. 81 and 82.
66 CRAIG

& DE BURCA, supra note 3, at 507.

67 Case T-37/92, Bureau Europden des Unions des Consommateurs v. Comm'n,
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3 of Regulation 17 one step further.68 Here, British and Japanese
motor manufacturers entered into an agreement that would
"restrict[...] the export of Japanese cars to the United Kingdom to
11% of the total annual car sales in that country."6 9 Two nonprofit groups instituted to protect consumer interests submitted a
complaint to the Commission regarding the proposed restriction.7"
The Commission did not allow the complaint, but upon a
complaint filed by the non-profits, the CFI annulled the
Commission's decision and ordered the Commission to pay the
costs of the action.7'
One of the most surprising decisions in European competition
law came in 2003 when the Commission blocked the proposed
merger between General Electric (GE) and Honeywell in General
Electric v. Commission.72 This case served as an important
illustrator of third party power in the European Union versus the
United States in the administration of antitrust laws and was the
first time the Commission enjoined a U.S. merger after it had been
cleared by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).73 The
two companies filed a joint action to request the CFI to annul the
Commission decision,74 but the CFI upheld the merger prohibition
despite its criticism of the Conmission's analysis of the market for
containing "manifest errors of assessment., 75 The case served a
more important function than just a further illustration of the CFI's
trend towards criticizing the Commission. In one of its most
1994 E.C.R. 11-285.
68 CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 3, at 507.
69

Case T-37/92,

2.

70 Id. T l.

71 Id.

77-78.

72 Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. v. Comm'n, 2005 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 690 (2005).
73 George Stephanov Georgiev, Recent Development, Bridging the Divide? The
European Court of First Instance Judgment in GE/Honeywell, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 518,

518 (2006).
74 Id.
75 Id. Specifically, the Commission found that due to GE's financial power the
merger with Honeywell could lead to "a dominant position in the market for corporate jet
aircraft engines and for small gas marine gas turbines." The CFI found fault with several
aspects of the Commission's analysis but noted that "the finding of firm dominance, is
'part of a complex economic assessment' to be performed by the Commission and is

entitled to deference." Id. at 520.
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debated decisions, the Commission demonstrated that they value
the opinion of third
parties above even the ruling of the United
76
States government.
IV. Significance of the Case
A combination of both the CFI's successive rejection of the
Commission's antitrust policies"7 and the new inclination towards
third party influence led to the Impala decision. The case broke
new ground as the first instance in which the CFI annulled a
merger clearance by the Commission,78 and the ruling became
even more significant because the unprecedented action was filed
in the CFI by a third party. The decision represents the growing
problem of the rapidly increasing third party power within the
European antitrust procedures and foretells a problem that could
eventually prove detrimental to the speed and efficiency of the
European court systems.79
A. Third PartyPower
One of the most undesirable consequences of this decision is
the possibility that due to the success of the third party underdog
and the "humiliating" language of the decision,8 ° there will now be
an unprecedented increase in competitor challenges to
Commission clearance decisions. 81 This berating language and the
influence of third parties can be seen in the CFI's description of
the Commission's decision as a "cursory examination"82 and in the
CFI's reprimand that the Commission's observations "appreciably
departed" from the Court's analysis.83 The merger was described
76

Fisher, supra note 11, at 361-362.

77 Some lawyers found that after the "revamping" by former competition
commissioner it was more difficult to block mergers and seemed to say, "if in doubt,
allow the merger to go ahead." Paul Meller & Jeff Leeds, Merger of Sony-BMG Units is
Rejected by Court in Europe,N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at C2.
78 Bretz, supra note 1,at 8.
79 Fisher, supra note 11, at 337.
80 Kirwin, supra note 35.
81 Bretz, supra note 1,at 8.
82 Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers and Labels Ass'n v. Comm'n, 2006 ECJ
CELEX LEXIS 359, 1 426 (2006); Steven Zeitchik & Phil Gallo, Wall of Sound, DAILY
VARIETY, July 14, 2006, at 1.

83 Case T-464/04 at

553.
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as not only "vitiated by a manifest error of assessment," 8 but as
missing vital economic "relevant data" that is necessary to fully
understand the market.8" The CFI also disapproved of the fact that
the Commission only used three points to support its decision that
there was no collective dominance, and the court proceeded to list
several more factors that should have been considered as leading
to price coordination.86 By using this harsh language, the CFI
demonstrated that the Commission must raise its standards for
merger clearances and that initial complaints by third parties
should be given a substantial amount of weight since they will be
given such deferential treatment by the CFI after the merger
review process.
The most unfortunate effect from this decision could come
from third party competitors who see this as an opportunity to
slow down a merger that would actually be in the best interest of
the market.87 In examining the effect excessive third party power
may have on the potential to discourage future mergers and on the
worldwide economy, the CFI should take to heart the words of
Douglas Jay. As the President of the Board of Trade in 1964, he
cautioned that although some mergers could "stifle competition,"
it should also be remembered "what mergers can in certain cases
do to achieve greater strength for our economy at home and
88
abroad.
Third party competitors can easily bring an action in the CFI
"as a tactic to disrupt pro-competitive mergers., 89 An excessive
number of actions filed would not only lead to a reduced incentive
to merge, but could also increase the cost to the Commission's

84

Id.1459.

85

Id.

86 Susan Butler, Legal Matters: Will Euro Court Undo Sony BMG?, BILLBOARD
MAG., July 29, 2006, at 2. These factors included the "publication of weekly hit charts,"
Case T-464/04 , T 349, the "long term stable relationships between retailers and all
majors," id. T 350, the "limited numbers of players on the market", id. 351, and the
"monitoring of the retail market." Id. 352.
87 Fisher, supra note I1, at 337.
88 James Fairburn, The Evolution of Merger Policy in Britain, in EUROPEAN
MERGERS AND MERGER POLICY 239, 241 (Matthew Bishop & John Kay eds., Oxford
University Press 1993) (citing Douglas Jay, reprinted in the 1978 Green Paper).
89 Bretz, supra note I.
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"merger control process" 90 that has historically been commended
for providing a rather concrete decision in a reasonable amount of
time.91 By not providing available standards and clear decision
making processes regarding complaints
submitted
by
competitors, 92 third parties have an incentive to file more actions
because it is best to err on the side of possibly slowing down a
merger rather than attempting to spend excessive time wading
through murky rules. As a policy consideration, the CFI should
consider the effects its decisions are having on pro-competitive
behavior; competitors are being given "an unparalleled
opportunity to abuse the process by delaying the transaction
through protests or other submissions... in effect, holding the
transaction hostage. Sometimes the delay itself will kill that
merger.... ",93
The prospect of third parties gaining this advantage is
particularly troublesome now, as European mergers are more
popular and profitable than ever.94 Similarly, the mergers are
growing to be an important indicator of a united Europe and the
Member States' efforts to "create a single market." 95 The
interference of third parties in the system could cause substantial
slowdowns in not only the economic efficiency of individual
countries, but also in the unification of the European antitrust
system. This case has important ramifications in markets that
spread beyond the music industry, specifically those in "mature,
90

Id.

91 Id. The costs could be increased if a "judicially nervous Commission"
determined that it is necessary for "in-depth reviews of mergers in complex or
complainant-rich markets, even though they are appropriate for clearance at their first
phase." Id. "Competition lawyers predict that to avoid another embarrassing reversal in
court, the commission will demand far more data from merging parties, placing a greater
burden on companies and possibly prolonging merger talks." Let's Try that Again, supra
note 8, at 61.
92 Fisher, supra note 11, at 337.
93 Id.
94 To the Barricades,ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2006. "A European merger wave has
been gathering momentum since last year, when firms came out of a period of tough
restructuring.
Strong corporate profits in 2004 encouraged companies to make
acquisitions - particularly since credit was cheap and plentiful. By the end of 2005 the
value of European deals that year had reached almost f 1 trillion, a volume not seen
since the technology bubble of 2000." Id.
95 Id.
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highly concentrated industries. 96 The court clearly indicated its
intent to continue harshly examining the Commission's merger
review process, as the CFI's description of the Commission's
performance as a "cursory examination" 97 brings to mind a teacher
with a student who must be closely watched after refusing to
properly do her homework. Furthermore, the court encouraged
third party complaints by ordering the Commission to pay three
quarters of Impala's legal costs. 98 According to one source, the
decision came down to nothing more than incorrect wording to
support its position, despite coherent and valid arguments by the
Commission. 9 The Impala decision has already succeeding in
sending signals to potential third party protestors that seem to
invite more actions. Impala itself indicated through its president,
Patrick Zelnick, that this result had been achieved when he noted
that "the group would be emboldened for another fight."' ° These
signals could be dangerous signs of encouragement to competitors
to file complaints for a system that takes pride in its efficient and
"strict timetable."10
' 1
B. Effect on Timetable
However, despite the possible encouragement the court may
have inadvertently sent to third party competitors by its decision,
many competition experts think that Impala may actually have
stepped on the court's toes by requesting an expedited procedure
and then taking more than double the typical length of time for an
expedited procedure.' °2 The decision came down approximately a
96 Let's Try That Again, supra note 8, at 61. These industries include those similar
to aerospace and commodities. Id. However, the move also serves as a warning to the
potential merger between Warner Music Group and the EMI Group that may "be scared
off by the ruling." Zeitchik & Gallo, supra note 80, at 2.
97 Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers and Labels Ass'n v. Comm'n, 2006 ECJ
CELEX LEXIS 359, 426 (2006); see also CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 3, at 1078
(warning that "the intensity of the review process has increased since the task has been
allocated to the CFI, and a number of high-profile decisions have been overturned on the
facts").
98 Case T-464/04 554.
99 Meller & Leeds, supra note 77.
10oZeitchik & Gallo, supranote 80, at 2.
101 Meller & Leeds, supra note 75.
102 Renee Cordes, Impala Wins a Battle but Pays a Price, July 17, 2006, DAILY
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year and a half after the complaint was filed, and the typical time
frame for an expedited procedure is under nine months."°3 In fact,
some of the attorneys involved with the case anticipate that the
court will set much firmer deadlines with future parties who
request expedited relief.'0 4 This could serve as an advantage to
future merging companies whose potential third party rivals may
stop and think before filing an action in the CFI if they know it is
unlikely to be approved for an expedited procedure. Without the
expedited procedure, a third party competitor has a greater
financial incentive not to file a complaint just to slow or prevent
the merger since it would require more time and money.
C. Benefits
In considering the effects of the Impala ruling, it is important
to note that third party involvement in the merger process has
benefits as well, and should not be phased out altogether. The
European system of allowing third parties a voice takes into
consideration that although mergers can be beneficial to
economies, °5 there can be detriments as well.0 6 The proposed
mergers that legitimately have anti-competitive effects should be
restrained, and it would be extremely dangerous, "to adopt a
generalized stance either pro or anti mergers per se."'

7

The

European system is also efficient in the sense that, if anything, the
permissibility of third parties to bring complaints brings even
more concerns than usual to the forefront before the merger is
allowed. It is important to allow these concerned parties to bring

DEAL; Case T-464/04, Indep. Music Publishers and Labels Ass'n v. Comm'n, 2006 ECJ
CELEX LEXIS 359, 1 546 (July 13, 2006.
103 Cordes, supra note 102.
104

Id.

105 Mergers generally have three main benefits: (1) Mergers allow previously small
companies to joined forces in order to reduce costs by "exploit[ing] economies of scale
and scope; (2) "Efficiency can be increased by replacing poor management through a
competitive market for corporate control;" and finally (3) "Merger can enable two
companies that are performing poorly against foreign rivals to form a 'national
champion' able to compete internationally." Matthew Bishop, European or National?
The Community's New Merger Regulation, in EUROPEAN MERGERS AND MERGER POLICY
294, 295 (Matthew Mishop & John Kay eds., Oxford University Press 1993).
106 Id.
107

Id.
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an action since it is easier to stop mergers that have the potential
to be anti-competitive, rather than penalizing this behavior once it
proves to be true.'
V. Conclusion
Impala has cast a new uncertainty over mergers within the
European Union through unclear guidelines that have the potential
to substantially increase third party competitor complaints. The
problems with this uncertainty are reflected by the statement of
then U.K. Trade Minister, John Redwood who noted in September
1990 that in order for the market to run efficiently it is critical that
companies be able to discern what party has the power to
"determin[e] the fate of [its] mergers."' 9 By muddying the waters
of merger review, the European Union is blatantly disregarding the
opportune position of "second mover advantage" they occupy in
competition policy. °
In order to benefit from developing
competition policies after many foreign countries and the
individual European states, the European Union should consider
implementing policies that mirror the most successful aspects of
countries such as the United States.
In 2002, then Commissioner Monti specifically proclaimed
that the "U.S.-Style prosecutorial regime, whereby the,
Commission might seek to challenge a proposed merger before the
European courts""' is not well suited for the European Union. 2
The merger review process utilized by the European Union has
been labeled a "front end" system since the Commission acts as a
competition administrative body to make the primary decision in
the case compared to the U.S. "back-end" method of judicial
108

See id.

109 Bishop, supra note 109, at 294.
110 Kalbfleisch, supra note 57, at 29. The second mover advantage occurs since the
EU has been able to develop their policies after seeing the developments of other
individual European countries as well as foreign countries in their development of
competition policy. Id.
III Mario Monti, European Competition Comm'r, Review of the EC Merger
Regulation - Roadmap for the reform project, Address at Conference on Reform of
European Merger Control before British Chamber of Commerce (June 4, 2002)
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business-regulation/antitrusteucompetitionpar
isi.pdf.
112 Id.
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involvement.113 Monti bolstered his statement that the U.S.
approach would not work in the European Union by stating the
current "front-end" method has two inherent benefits not found
elsewhere: first, it generates a "swift"' 4 response (typically by the
end of a month, but not usually longer than five months) and is
"remarkably transparent: every notification results in a published
and fully reasoned decision."' 15
However, these reasons are inaccurate if the Commission
continues to value speed over accuracy.
Currently, the
Commission has been almost consistently overturned by the CFI
rendering a longer, rather than "swifter" process since the parties
not only receive an inappropriate judgment at the front end but are
then subjected to a further review by the CFI. The second benefit,
transparency, has also been questioned."1 6 Although the decisions
are publicly reported, the third party complaints submitted by
competitors are not always available for full public disclosure due
to a concern over the release of confidential information." 7 The
third party competitors also possess an unclear amount of power in
the merger review process which creates a distinctly untransparent process with an unpredictable result." 8 During one
hearing, representatives from the merging parties' competitor were
able to participate in the Commission hearing, question the
competitors' witnesses, and examine the proposed remedies.' 9
This type of unforeseen participation by a party with a clear vested
interest in stopping the merger makes it difficult for parties to
anticipate the type of review they will receive and from whom
they will be receiving it.
Additionally, Monti's words should be viewed in light of the
fact that he, in the same speech, indicated his "healthy skepticism"

113 Id.
114 Id.

115 Id.

116 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 11, at 337.
117 Id. n.34.
118 See Id. at 337.

119 Id. at n.35 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Final Report of the International
Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust 56 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/
finalreport.htm).
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of mergers. 20 Although Monti did not go so far as to state that
mergers should be discouraged as a general rule,' 2' his speech
indicated that if faced with a choice, he would be prefer a system
with more stringent regulations at the cost of preventing even
some valid mergers rather than risk looser regulations that allowed
mergers that may have anti-competitive effects:'2 2 In light of the
recent Impala holding, it is possible that his recent reforms
involving increasing power for third parties have succeeded in
creating a system that does err on the side of deterring even valid
mergers.
A. United States Contrast
The U.S. system of merger clearance avoids similar problems
by third parties through clear procedural guidelines. In the United
States, the companies must go to either the Department of Justice
(DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in order to receive
clearance for a merger. 12 3 Unlike the Commission, the DOJ or
FTC is not required to give the rationale for its decision, and third
parties are not allowed to appeal the decision.'24 Third parties are
only permitted to voice their opposition by bringing an entirely
new action in the courts.'25 Since the DOJ or FTC does not
publish a list of reasons for its decision, the third party must start
from scratch to prove to the court that the merger will impede
competition. 26 This process serves as an advantage to the U.S.

120

Monti, supra note 111, at 7.

Id. at 6-7 (citing From Merger to Misery, FIN. TIMES UK, 25 April 2002 [noting
mergers create little value]).
122 "So, while it seems clear that some mergers do create value and lead to
efficiencies, many others - some believe more than half of all mergers - fail to deliver
and indeed destroy value. Perhaps without going so far as a recent editorial comment in
the 'Financial Times', which indicated that 'mergers create little value' and
'shareholders consistently fail to restrain management from empire building' and
concluded from this that 'far fewer mergers should occur', in my view it is appropriate to
maintain a touch of 'healthy scepticism' with regard to efficiency claims, particularly in
relation to transactions which appear to present competition problems." Id. at 7 (citing
From Merger to Misery, FIN. TIMES UK, 25 April 2002).
123 Butler, supranote 86.
121

124
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system by weeding out third party competitors who do not have a
legitimate complaint and possibly want to simply stall the merger
for their own pecuniary gain. The daunting financial burden of
bringing the case to court is much greater than any small gain
received by stalling the merger and ensures that only genuine
complaints will be brought into the court system. Alternatively, in
the Commission, third parties are able to block a merger without
proving the anticompetitive effects in an adjudicative setting.'27
While the U.S. has taken a more cautionary approach to
competitor complaints realizing they operate under "skewed
incentives," 128 the EU typically allows these parties to have a voice
as long as 29"sufficient interest" in the outcome can be
demonstrated.1
For this reason, the European system has been criticized for
valuing competitors' complaints over an objective investigation
into the possible detrimental effects on the market.13 ° In general,
one of the biggest complaints made in the European merger review
process is the Commission's predilection for allowing the parties
who have an obvious interest in preventing the merger to carry so
much control in the decision.131
Additionally, as the global marketplace continues to grow, it
will become more important for the United States and the
European Union to have similar, although not necessarily
identical, systems in order to ensure predictability and uniformity
in global merger decisions. The different roles played by the
courts, the different time tables, and most importantly, the
different roles played by third parties could create barriers to
127 Fisher, supra note 11, at 333.
128 Id. at 362.
129 Id. at 361.

130 Id. at 335 (citing Competition Policy Should be Focused on Consumers, THE

INDEP. (London), July 5, 2001, at 3 ("Where US law isbased on protecting consumers,
EU competition policy focuses primarily on protecting competitor companies.")); No
Time for Protectionism, Bus. WK., July 23, 2001, at 98 ("The EU's focus on competitors

rather than consumers makes the Bush Administration suspicious."); Robert Pitofsky,
Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: A View from the Middle, 76 ST.

JOHN'S L. REv. 583, 586 n.15 (2002) (asserting that "the principal area of divergence
between European and American antitrust law is the EU's apparent willingness to protect
competitors rather than the competitive process").
131See Fisher, supra note 11, at 361-362.
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international mergers that may have political as well as economic
ramifications. The GE/Honeywell decision provided a glimpse of
the disastrous consequences that can result when countries have
different expectations of mergers and pro-competitive behavior.'32
Although there are many lessons to be learned from both systems,
the European Union should employ a merger system that parallels
the United States' method of dealing with third party attacks in
order to separate the legitimate claims from those merely intended
to postpone a merger by clogging the system of European
efficiency. If a change is not made, then the very characteristics
that Commissioner Monti heralded as the benefits of the European
system, transparency and efficiency, will be obliterated by the
CFI's propensity to encourage objections by competitors who will
be more than happy to take advantage of the chink in the armor of
merging companies.
COURTNEY P. HARRIS

132 Georgiev, supra note 73, at 520-21.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. XXXIII

